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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a quantitative cyber risk management framework to 
implement in small to medium organizations’ operational plan.  This paper will analyze 
resources to estimate patterns of attacks, cost of assets, cost of data records, and cost/benefit 
analysis.  With proper calculations, a small and medium business owner will be able to follow 
the framework and produce two outcomes: annual loss to the organization and cost of benefit 
estimation to discover return on investment.  After these two outcomes one of three decisions 
will be determined by executives or stakeholders, either accept risk, transfer risk, or invest in risk 
management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table of Contents 
DEDICATION/EPIGRAPH .................................................................................3 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .....................................................................................4 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................5 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................8 
LIST OF FIGURES ...............................................................................................9 
CHAPTER I .........................................................................................................10 
DEVELOPING A QUANTITATIVE FRAMEWORK TOOL TO IMPLEMENT CYBER 
RISK MANAGEMENT.......................................................................................10 
Introduction ........................................................................................................1 
CHAPTER II ..........................................................................................................3 
CHALLENGES OF CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT ......................................3 
Financial Challenge ...........................................................................................4 
Insurance Challenge ...........................................................................................5 
Technical Skills Challenges ...............................................................................7 
Regulations Not Clearly Defined .......................................................................8 
Availability of Information ................................................................................9 
Neglecting Employment Training ....................................................................10 
CHAPTER III ......................................................................................................12 
DATA BREACH REPORTS METHODOLOGY ............................................12 
Verizon Data Breach Reports ..........................................................................13 
Ponemon Cost Data Breach Reports ................................................................15 
CHAPTER IV.......................................................................................................18 
BOWTIE MODEL ANALOGY .........................................................................18 
Applying Bowtie Model to Cyber Risk Management Framework ..................22 
CHAPTER V ........................................................................................................25 
ANALYZING DATA RESULTS .......................................................................25 
Common Industry Data Breaches ....................................................................27 
Seven Primary Threat Actions .........................................................................31 
Identifying Assets ............................................................................................32 
Cost of Data Breaches ......................................................................................37 
 Building Quantitative Assessment information from Data Reports ................39 
CHAPTER VI.......................................................................................................47 
CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK: AN INTEGRATION OF THE 
VERIZON AND PONEMON REPORTS .........................................................47 
Applying Quantitative Algorithm ....................................................................51 
CHAPTER VII .....................................................................................................60 
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................60 
REFERENCES .....................................................................................................62 
 
 
 
 LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 The Four A's .............................................................................................26 
Table 2 Descriptions of 9 Patterns (Categories) ....................................................30 
Table 3 Most Common Pattern per Industry..........................................................32 
Table 4 Description of Seven Threats ....................................................................34 
Table 5 Breaches Per Year .....................................................................................36 
Table 6 Industries Top Three Common Asset Breached Per Year ........................41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 The Activity-based Costing Process ........................................................15 
Figure 2 Bowtie Model Structure ..........................................................................19 
Figure 3 Bowtie Diagram.......................................................................................24 
Figure 4 Average Cost Per Capita Record .............................................................42 
Figure 5 Direct and Indirect Cost Per Capita .........................................................43 
Figure 6 2016 Industry Customer Turnover Rate ..................................................45 
Figure 7 2018 Industry Customer Turnover Rate ..................................................45 
Figure 8 2017 Industry Customer Turnover Rate ..................................................45 
Figure 9 Average Customer Turnover Rate 2010-2018 ........................................45 
Figure 10 Cyber Risk Framework Model ..............................................................48 
Figure 11 Bowtie Diagram.....................................................................................55 
Figure 12 Bowtie Example ....................................................................................57 
Figure 13 Discovery of Breach Timeline ...............................................................58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
CHAPTER I  
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Introduction 
Risk is the measure of extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or 
event, and typically a function of (i) the adverse impacts that would arise if the circumstance or 
event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence.i  Considering risk in its transitive verb form, 
it is an event which places a direct object in jeopardy of being exposed to a hazard or dangerous 
circumstance.  In cybersecurity risk information systems are the direct objects at jeopardy of 
being impacted by an adverse event.  In order to control or mitigate these circumstances, cyber 
risk management must be implemented as a supporting process to manage information systems 
security for organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, and the Nation.ii   
The purpose of this paper is to analyze previous breach report data and design a fundamental 
framework model for small and medium organizations to quantify cyber risk management.  
Developing a base framework for small and medium organizations to implement also sustains an 
organization’s longevity after a cyber-attack occur.  Qualitative and Quantitative risk assessment 
are key elements of implementing risk management.  However, both are challenged with barriers 
due to the lack of resources and skills.  Challenges will be discussed in Chapter 2.  For the 
purpose of this paper a quantitative risk analysis will be the key emphasis.  To build a framework 
necessary to analyze and quantify cyber risk management, the following four factors must be 
present: (1) Asset Value, (2) Data Record Cost, (3) Cost/Consequence Modeling, and (4) Cost 
Benefit Analysis.     
Cyber risk management becomes a challenge for small and medium organizations to implement 
due to lack of technical skills, resources, and support.iii  For small and medium organization to 
efficiently budget an investment in cyber risk controls, a Quantitative framework must be 
available for the stakeholders and senior management to evaluate cost.   
Two common reports are analyzed to cipher cyber data breaches and cost of data breaches.  The 
present paper analyzes the Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report and Ponemon Institute Cost 
of a Data Breach Report to discover common attack methods, provide estimated cost of breached 
data records, estimated cost of business and implementing security controls, and cost of cyber 
breaches within specific industries.   
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The following chapters will discuss the elements to building and modeling cyber risk 
management framework.  Chapter 3, analyzes data breach reports methodology for Verizon Data 
Breach Reports and Ponemon Institute Cost of Data Breach Reports.  Chapter 4, relates the 
Bowtie Model Analogy to build a cost analysis of security controls to mitigate or apprehend an 
attack.  Chapter 5, analyze data results to build patterns of attacks, cost of data records after a 
cyber breach occur, and building the quantitative framework.  Chapter 6, presents the three step 
Cyber Risk Management Framework Model and a complete walk through of the process.  In 
conclusion, Chapter 7 summarizes the complete Cyber Risk Management Framework concept 
and outcome. 
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CHAPTER II 
CHALLENGES OF CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT 
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To establish the context of risk-related activities, challenges of small and medium organizations 
must be acknowledged.  Collectively, challenges throughout organizations include (but are not 
limited to) financial, technical skill level, insurance liability, Regulations not clearly defined, 
availability of information, and neglected employment training.iv  
Financial Challenge 
Organizational operation challenges are aligned with the financial welfare of the organization.  
Stakeholders and executives are concerned with return on investment before allocating a portion 
of budget to mitigate cyber risk.  Without a clear vision as to how an investment in cyber risk 
management will alleviate the likelihood of an organization losing revenue, executives may not 
be willing to invest in cyber risk management budget.   
Simon Marvel suggests that financial and technical gap is a hindrance to executives.  From a 
financial standpoint, executives are not as willing to invest in cyber risk management if it does 
not directly improve their financial goals: earnings growth, sales target, economic value added, 
efficiency savings and market share.v 
In the absence of financial support, challenges arise with the inability to purchase updated, 
eventually leads to legacy equipment.  Legacy equipment evolves into multiple disadvantages for 
Information Technology (I.T.) Professionals.  Network weaknesses arise such as software 
incompatibilities, vulnerabilities from unpatched security ports, or inability to properly configure 
according to best practices.  Therefore, leading to threat exposures.  A survey conducted by Ernst 
Young in 2017 revealed 46 % of 1200 executive participants from organizations around the 
world were faced with outdated security controls and architecture.vi  Considering one in ten 
organizations within that same survey lacks a breach detection program, 75% of respondents rate 
the maturity of their “vulnerability identification” as very low to moderate.  Only 4% considered 
their organization as fully capable of tracking relevant risks and threats.   
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Insurance Challenge 
Cyber insurance is defined as, “the transfer of financial risk associated with network and 
computer incidents to a third party…”vii  Deficient insurance coverage and the reluctance to 
financially support an organization in lieu of a cyber breach, places strain or liability solely on 
the organization.  One strain an organization encounter, lead to impractical security.  Impractical 
security consists of a network without proper security infrastructure configuration.  Further 
complications include insurers not investing. 
Insurance companies are concerned with the “transfer” of financial responsibility.  The concern 
for insurers is, enabling organizations to become dependent on insurers, and neglect efforts of 
securing their domain and infrastructure first. 
Impractical security may become more common as the well-defined gap of responsibility 
between executives and technical staff reside.  In most organizations today, there is distinct gap 
between business leaders and security teams.  Essentially, a disconnect with security teams are 
absorbed in trying to determine what a cyber incident is and how fast it can be stopped, while the 
business leaders are laser focused on only the impact to the organization. 
These gaps create a substantial risk for insurance companies, because the insurers are not certain 
organizations have properly implemented security controls to mitigate risk, which results in 
greater cost to the insurance company and loss in revenue.  As a result, insurance companies 
offer less than optimal coverage and premiums cost rise significantly.     
 
The unpredictable characteristics of a cyber breach is a factor to higher premiums.  The lack of 
data history, progression of technology and complexity of attacks make cyber breaches more 
difficult to predict and quantify.  For instance, between June and November hurricanes are most 
easily predicted.  However, cyber breaches occur dynamically.  According to A.M. Best’s report, 
a lack of historical experience and tested cyber exposure models continue to foster uncertainty of 
underwriting cyber insurance.viii  Stakeholders and executives are unwilling to invest into 
insurance policies due to the inability to provide reasonable coverage from such a disaster.   
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According to the Insurance Journal, the total number of cyber insurance claims, in the U.S. 
market alone, were close to doubling between 2016 and 2017, from 5,955 to 9,017.  This 
demonstrates the need for more efficient methods of quantifying risk.  Completely stopping risk 
by implementing more cost-effective tools is not a financially effective method.   
 
As insurance claims rise, revenue for security control equipment raised also.   In a report from 
research firm Gartner, cyber risk is causing significant costs to business practices.  For instance, 
they state: “Worldwide cyber-security spending for 2015 topped $75 billion and in spite of this 
level of spending, we have seen 2000 data breaches, 700 million personal records stolen, and an 
average financial loss of $3.5M per incident.”  However, the most shocking statistic is that on 
average, organizations only know that they have been hacked less than 30% of the time.ix  In 
spite of spending more dividends on equipment and software, the cyber breach incidents 
continue to dominate the networks and cost twice as much financial damage. 
 
Reports show the average cost of cleanup for a cyber breach in a small business is $690,000, and 
for a middle market companies over $1 million.x  Collectively insurance companies have 
suggested the following challenges in providing premium coverage: 
• Scarcity of historical data 
• Cyber risk is dynamic, and sometimes suddenly and drastically changes due to technical 
progress and the use of novel systems and devices. 
• Laws and Regulation may significantly alter corporate risk management strategies and 
losses insured under a cyber risk policy, thus posing additional risk to insurers 
The spike in Cyber breaches and high revenue cost to recover from a cyber breach have caught 
global attention of Executive Leaders.  Executive Orders, National Laws, and open dialogue 
have implied an immediate concern for processes and procedures to be implemented in all areas 
of business.   
Four reasons insurance policies cost is driven up: (1) Newness of product and small size of risk 
pools; (2) Small number of market participants; (3) Limited data, making larger risk; and (4) 
Require costly state verification and upfront risk assessments.xi 
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After considering the failing efforts in the past to protect against cyber breaches, little confidence 
remains in a successful defense.  Therefore, stakeholders and executives are not investing budget 
in cyber risk management.     
Two reasons smaller organizations find difficulty in implementing cyber risk management plans 
are the magnitude and complexity of cybersecurity risk, and the investment draw on precious 
corporate resourcesxii.  Cyber breaches frequently changing and creates an uncertainty as to 
which security method is best to implement.  Therefore, insurance companies are not portraying 
an affordable investment coverage to small and medium organizations. 
Financial loss of business and high premiums signifies a demand to continue developing 
frameworks to influence investing in cyber risk management operational plans.  Insurance 
companies are more willing to cover organizations that have proper planning and contingency 
plans in place.  Planning risk management allow businesses to know what assets are at risk, the 
value of the asset(s), and plan how to protect, cover, or accept the loss of losing and recovering 
the asset(s) in a different manner. 
Technical Skills Challenges 
Skill level is essential to how well risk can be managed by technical staff within an organization.  
Lacking knowledge and skills contribute to ineffective managed risk and unavailable technical 
details to assess and mitigate further events.   
Advanced skills such as data learning are lacking in small and medium organizations.  Larger 
organizations with budgets of $250 Million and greater are more instrumental in distributing cost 
for this skill level.  Organizations with less than $50 Million are less likely to allocate cost or 
find reasoning to fulfill these positions.xiii  Technical professionals are able to track and analyze 
real time changes to data over time.  With this level of insight into the network, technical 
professionals discover irregular traffic more efficiently.   
The ability to trace vulnerabilities, threats and breaches, may lead to accurate historical data of 
patterns and data breach commonalities.  Future predictions and decisions will be based on this 
historical data. Organizations ability to make future predictions helps stakeholders plan their 
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operational budget to protect the assets that are most at risk.  Protecting assets is a key factor in 
cyber risk management framework.   
One solution to consider for smaller organizations who lack advance skills is to rely on larger 
organizations to communicate data sharing between organizations.  Publicizing information help 
smaller organizations become knowledgeable of popular patterns, vulnerabilities, threats, and 
breaches to remain informed and updated to adjust and improve skill technical levels.  If 
technology is not improved, results evolve into outdated technology and staff not motivated to 
engage in learning new skills.  Stagnant skill growth is another result in legacy technology and 
inefficient practices.  Ultimately, this technology will no longer be supported or updated with 
proper security patches, vulnerabilities, and weaknesses created in the network.  
A second technical challenge relates to executives and technical personnel difference of 
viewpoints.  Confounded terminology between financial and technical personnel result in 
unproductive outcomes.  Therefore, executives will not support the financial obligation of 
implementing time and budget to support an unconceivable plan.  This language gap hinders 
information systems advancement and attaining proper security.  The development of a universal 
language is necessary to build a bridge for understanding between the two parties.   
Ekelhart et.al [14]xiv states that common, logical and effective understanding of the fundamental 
Information Systems (IS) problems are required in order for the IS profession to evolve 
significantly.  Risk-based Cybersecurity Framework is the National Standard which provide 
common language for all organizations.xv National Institute of Standard Technology (NIST) 
framework was developed by international small and large organizations, with guidance from 
NIST.  These standards and guidelines from NIST will be referenced throughout this paper to 
build a framework for quantifying risk management.   
Regulations Not Clearly Defined 
State and federal laws are not clear regarding responsibilities of cyber breaches.  Unlike the 
European Union that operates under one governed law (the General Data Protection Regulation), 
each state within the United States governs cybersecurity responsibility individually.xvi  With 
jurisdiction boundaries within the same Nation, limited power exists when prosecuting across 
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borders, which erect a major concern.  Attempting to hold a person responsible for an act which 
is not enforced by law enforcement in another jurisdiction eliminates the necessary power and 
control to investigate and prosecute an offender.   
States pursuing such strategies will inevitably face dilemmas regarding who and what to 
prioritize and how far to go in their defense.xvii  The borderless nature of cyberspace raises legal 
and ethical questions for governments.  Should the state accept responsibility for defending 
networks and computers of its companies that lie outside of its territory?  Should it defend those 
of foreign owned companies or multinational corporations located within its territory?  Should it 
extend its defense to cloud-based assets?  Will organizations with less restrictions become relax 
in securing networks?  These questions pose concerns to how regulations differ and can cause 
controversial circumstances.   
Availability of Information 
Too commonly managers, executives and stakeholders are disjointed between each other, 
concerning an organizations’ risk management plan.  Questions continue to rise amongst 
stakeholders who feel there has been no clarification regarding cyber risk management.  Olga 
Botero, Director of Evertec Inc. and Founding Partner, C&S Customers and Strategy expressed, 
“There are still many questions unanswered for boards, including: How good is our security 
program?  How do we compare to peers?  There is a big lack of benchmarking on practices.”xviii   
Stakeholders are dissatisfied with the quality of management related to cybersecurity 
information.  To grasp a better understanding of the technical demand to control data breaches, 
stakeholders desire to see Key Performance Indicators (KPI) in alignment with the business plan 
for the organizations.  Measurable goals with clear objectives enlighten how cyber risk 
management plans align with organizations business plans.  By quantifying data breaches 
according to the various companies cost of informational data records compromised, over time 
organizations are able to measure the company’s performance and progress toward meeting a 
goal.  With the ability to observe data breach outcomes for an extended time period (i.e. one-
year, three-year, five-year benchmarks), Key Risk Indicators (KRI) can be measured to 
determine how frequent an activity occur and its level of risk to the organization.  Without 
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transparency of comprehensible information, benchmark reports will not show progress or return 
on investment.   
Neglecting Employment Training 
Employees are key targets to security within an industry’s network.  Today’s industry consists of 
thousands of endpoints, with majority controlled by employees.  Each endpoint is an entrance of 
opportunity for an attacker to enter the network.  This creates an overwhelming approach to 
protect an organizations’ network.  Information security training is for both technical staff and 
non-technical.  Presenting relevant training is the key to both groups. 
Technical staff must remain trained and updated on new equipment and best practices.  After 
conducting a study by Information Systems Security Association (ISSA) and analyst Enterprise 
Strategy Group (ESG), a survey of 343 cybersecurity professionals expressed with 67% 
agreement, maintaining appropriate training was difficult.xix Technology advances on a daily 
average.  These advancements create innovative ways not only for communication but security.  
As legacy technology has already been discussed as a concern, it is important to mention its 
inability to remain updated and patched to new threats and vulnerabilities.  New methods and 
configuration solutions will be implemented to accommodate new threats.  Learning in the field 
of technology cannot be adjourned.  It must be considered as a professional goal and attained 
through continuing education, certification, and experimentation. 
Non-technical staff may be trained on how to identify threats and the common tactics used to 
lure them into a security breach.  With knowledge staff become more susceptible to why and 
how certain practices are imperative.  Employee training not only enlighten awareness for in 
office but home and public locations as well.  Training should be interactive and relative to non-
users. 
Ponemon Institute results reveal that training employees was the most popular method of 
mitigating breaches between 2009-2015, averaging 54%.  In 2019 reports confirmed employee 
training reduced total cost of data breaches in the United States by $270,000 dollars.  However, 
in small and medium organizations, operational budget and lack of insight still hinder training 
for both technical and non-technical staff.  Surveys conducted by ISSA and ESG reveals 38% of 
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cyber professionals’ organization do not invest in appropriate training.  With such a deficiency in 
training, smaller companies are used as stepping stones to larger companies.xx  Attackers target 
these companies as entrance points and wait for the opportunity to connect to larger companies 
when the opportunity presents.   
As networks are setup to interact with customer services, smaller organizations allow third party 
companies access into their network through remote applications.  Services such as air 
conditioning HVAC or security camera monitoring, use remote connections to access equipment 
on the network.  The smaller companies who provide these services are infected first.  Once 
connected to the inside of a larger companies, an attacker pivots their way onto the larger 
company’s network.  Remote access is just one way of forced entry to larger networks.  
Challenges exist and create many obstacles for non-technical, technical, managers, executives, 
and stakeholders.  Some issues overflow into state, national, and foreign issues.  These 
challenges have been identified globally and market a concern for numerous organizations.  
Knowledge and experience will be the key to mitigating risk over time. 
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CHAPTER III  
DATA BREACH REPORTS METHODOLOGY 
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Verizon Data Breach and Ponemon Institute Cost Data Breach reports are referenced throughout 
this paper to analyze attack patterns, common attack methods, commonly attacked assets, cost of 
data breaches, and individual industry loss of business.  Losses related to asset value, and the 
frequency rate of an occurrence help identify the first step of the quantitative framework (details 
in chapter VI). Cost of data records will quantify the second step of the framework.  These two 
major breach reports stand out when considering breach details.  For the past decade historical 
data from forensic investigations and partnerships have been reported using a consistent 
methodology, industry target commonalities, and reports from both Nationwide and Global 
breaches.  Other data breach reports such as Symantec Internet Security Threat Reports and 
Microsoft Security Intelligence Reports include information similar, but based from these 
reports. 
With these two reports filtering majority of data, a synopsis of information can be gathered to 
help quantify assets and data records.  Analyzing and organizing data will identify patterns in 
threats, vulnerabilities, and breached data records related to specific industries.  Within these 
industries cost of records and assets can be estimated.  Both Verizon and Ponemon Institute 
reported similar industries as targeted attacks involving breach attempts and compromised data.  
Differences in reports help complement each other to relate breach attack patterns and cost.  
Verizon Data Breach Reports 
Early Verizon Data Breach reports were analyzed by the Verizon Business RISK team and less 
than twenty contributors.  They begin recording data breach incidents in 2004.  As reports 
became more consistent, by 2019 seventy-three contributors submitted data incidents and 
breaches.  In 2010 reports, United States Secret Service (USSS) developed a partnership with 
Verizon to globally enhance the scope of data breaches.  With a global presence, by 2016 
Verizon reports grew to include 82 countries.  
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Methodology 
Verizon reviews all incidents and converts them to the Vocabulary Event Recording Information 
System (VERIS) framework.  The basics of the framework include three methods: 
1. Direct recording of paid external forensic investigations and related intelligence 
operations conducted by Verizon using the VERIS Webapp 
2. Direct recording by using VERIS 
3. Converting partners existing schema into VERIS 
The VERIS Webapp Java Script Object Notation (JSON) and spreadsheets are placed within an 
automated workflow that converts the incidents and breaches into the VERIS JSON format (if 
necessary).  Missing enumerations are added and then records are validated against business 
logic and VERIS schema.  The automated workflow subsets the data and analyzes the results.  
Based on the results of the exploratory analysis, the validation logs from the workflow and 
discussions with the partners providing the data, is cleaned and re-analyzed.  This process runs 
nightly for roughly three months as data is collected and analyzed.   
Cyber breach incident’s eligibility is classified and separated into subsets.  The baseline of an 
entry must be confirmed as a security incident, which entail a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability.  Once the baseline of an entry is met, an assessment to filter the incident is 
completed.  The “quality” of a filtered incident consists of: 
1. The incident must include at minimum seven enumerations (e.g. threat actor variety, 
threat action category, variety of integrity loss, etc.) across 34 fields, or be a Distributed 
Denial of Service (DDoS).   
2. The incident must have at least one known VERIS threat action category (hacking, 
malware, etc.) 
All incidents must be in timeframe of the analysis between November 1 to October 31.   
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Data subsets are incidents which pass the “quality” filter requirements mentioned above.  In 
addition to normal filtered incidents, separate categories are created to analyze data which would 
obscure smaller trends (i.e. botnets). 
Limitations 
Verizon does not claim to include all data breach occurrences.  Records are combined from 
contributors consisting of isolated incidents.  Many breaches go un reported and are not included.  
Therefore, Verizon’s confidence in their statistical data ranges from +/- 0.4% for incidents and 
+/- 2% for breaches, averaging about 95% confidential rate.  
Ponemon Cost Data Breach Reports 
Ponemon Institute states their study focus pertains a business process and not data protection or 
privacy compliance.  Their goal is to calculate the cost of a data breach.  The methodology 
behind their study is related to activity-based costing (ABC).  This method identifies cost and 
assigns a cost based on actual usage.  Activity Based Costing involves an approach to the costing 
and monitoring of activities, which involves tracing resource consumption and costing final 
outputsxxi.  ABC is driven by cost drivers, which are the activities that cause costs to increase.  
 
Figure 1 The Activity-based Costing Process 
Cost is based on estimates provided by companies who determine the cost of activities necessary 
to resolve a data breach.  Two categories are considered when estimating costs of these data 
breaches.  Immediate Response to a data breach and Aftermath Response: 
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Immediate response consists of: 
• Conducting investigations and forensics to determine the root cause of the data breach 
• Determining the probable victims of the data breach 
• Organizing the incident response team 
• Conducting communications and public relations outreach 
• Preparing notice documents and other required disclosures to data breach victims and 
regulators 
• Implementing call center procedures and specializing training 
Aftermath responses consists of: 
• Audit and consulting services 
• Legal services for defense 
• Legal services for compliance 
• Free or discounted services offered to victims of the breach 
• Identity protection services 
• Lost customer business based on calculating customer turnover 
• Customer acquisition and loyalty program costs 
Once the estimates are provided for the Immediate and Aftermath responses, costs are 
categorized as Direct and Indirect.  Respectfully direct expenses outlay to accomplish a given 
activity and indirect expenses is the amount of time, effort, and other organizational resources 
allocated to a data breach resolution, but not always a direct cash expenditure. 
Data Collection Methodology 
Ponemon’s data collection methods relies on a numerical estimation based on the knowledge and 
experience of each participant.  Benchmark incidents rate direct cost estimates for each cost 
category by marking a variable range in a number line format.  To preserve confidentiality each 
participant was asked to mark a number between the lower and upper limits of a range for each 
data breach cost category.  Cost were limited to known ranges pertaining to business operations 
who handle personal information.xxii   
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By 2019, Ponemon reports were conducted from 507 organizations, 16 countries or regions, and 
between 2,000 to 100,000 breach records.  Seventeen industries were included in reports which 
contained records and information stored on assets within the organization, or from a third 
party’s network with remote access. 
Limitations 
The majority of organizations are considered to have mature privacy or information security 
programs formed with personnel who directly deal with cost revenue and budgets.  This 
insinuate most organizations surveyed were financially stable and advanced organizations.  
Ponemon Reports lack scientifically driven methods; therefore, it has acknowledged an error rate 
of confidence cannot be provided.  Limited participants do not represent the entire number of 
breach occurrences, therefore unreported cost may differ for some industries.  Cost inaccuracy 
may also be a result of inaccurate reported costs.  However, Ponemon does perform checks and 
balances for each benchmark processed.  Each breach currency rate is converted to U.S. dollars 
resulting in possible local deflated costs.     
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CHAPTER IV  
BOWTIE MODEL ANALOGY 
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The Bowtie Model is used to identify, assess and analyze the cost/benefit of an organization’s 
assets and controls.1  First it identifies the Critical Event (known as Top Event) which may 
threaten the organization’s confidentiality, integrity, or availability.  Second, it assesses the 
organization causes, consequences, and barriers which leads to a critical event.  In conjunction, 
the bowtie model exposes possible results and controls to mitigate the critical event.  Finally, it 
directly leads to an organizations cost/benefit calculation, which factors into the conclusion of 
the quantitative framework.  Models are a dynamic and inclusive way to gather information and 
make decisions. 
Models help provide compact clean visuals to specific details.  The relationship between the flow 
of models and applying a concept help identify more concise overall significance and compact 
details.  The Bowtie model method is more common in safety industrial fields such as oil & gas, 
chemical, aviation, or mining.  These industries use four basic methods of the model to protect or 
mitigate a catastrophic event occurring:  
• Top Event (Critical Event) 
• Fault Trees 
• Event Trees 
• Barrier thinking.xxiii 
 
Figure 2 Bowtie Model Structure 
 
1It’s Origination stem from an early version of the fault tree and leading to the event tree.  This method was 
developed by Nielsen (1971).  Nielsen described the critical event as a ‘transgression of the safety limit of vital 
reactor parameter’. (IADC, 2010, Health Safety and Environment Case Guidelines for Mobile Offshore Drilling 
Units. Tech. Rep. International Association of Drilling Contractors, Houston) 
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The Bowtie Model in Figure 2 replicates Nielsen’s cause and consequence diagram.  Today it 
has transformed into the four methods discussed below.  Once all four methods are complete, a 
quantitative analysis can be determined.  This analysis will extend into determining how risk is 
managed.  Executives and stakeholders of an organization will assess the barriers in place and 
determine if the return on investment to is greater than the loss resulting from the Critical Event 
occurring. 
Method 1: Top (Critical) Event 
The Bowtie Model is a diagram used to present a critical moment of failure in the system.  It is 
centered around a Top Event.  This point of the diagram represents the moment control is 
lost.xxiv, xxv For purposes of this framework the Top Event will be referred to as Critical Event.   
Critical Events are known as the common junction connecting major “causes” and 
“consequences” contributing to a specific point of failure.  Several pathways are created starting 
from the Critical Event and extending outward.  Possible “Causes” of the Critical Event are listed 
to the left of model.  Resulting “Consequences” are listed to the right of model.  These two 
analogies present the comparison of causes and consequence to exhibit before executives and 
stakeholders who make decisions of the organization’s investment budget.  Executives and 
stakeholders reconcile rather their final decision to invest is more profitable than accepting the 
risk and enduring consequences.   
Method 2: Fault Tree 
The Fault Tree refers to the “Causes” or possibilities which may occur leading to a critical event.  
These events include any vulnerability or threat which exposes the organization to a Critical 
Events identified in Method 1.  A fault tree magnifies how well the organization is currently 
prepared to prevent or manage risk and what policies and/or controls are in place.  Typically, 
“Fault Events” can be read from left to right enumerating “Causes” (threats & vulnerabilities) 
leading to a “Critical Event”.   
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Vulnerabilities and threats can initially be determined from Verizon Data Breach Reports.  
Internal technical staff, if available, can provide insight from self-initiated vulnerability scans or 
a third-party assessment can be acquired.  Each fault (cause) should be identified and listed for 
consideration.   
Method 3: Event Tree 
The Event Tree represents “consequences” which result from the Critical Event occurring.  Once 
the critical event has transpired the consequences are resulting factors from this specific event.  
Therefore, the Event Tree typically expands to the right of bowtie listing these results.  Reading 
the events from left to right indicates the Critical Event occurring first, then consequences 
evolving into possible outcomes following afterwards.  Events may be listed in any order.   
The current paper extract consequences from both Verizon and Ponemon Reports to be analyzed 
in this study.  Results such as cost of replacing assets, downtime, customer turnover, loss of 
business income, cost of records, direct and indirect cost, fees, branding, etc. are estimated 
outcomes from both reports.  However, internal business managers, executives, and technical 
staff may add or reduce possible consequences depending on business needs.  Each consequence 
is normally attached to an estimated cost.  These results help drive the quantitative outcomes and 
calculate the Annual Loss Expectancy. 
Method 4: Barriers 
The ultimate goal is to mitigate the Critical Event from occurring. Business continuity and 
resilience are its key factors.  According to Sklet, “There is no universal and commonly accepted 
definition of terms like safety barrier…”  He proceeds to define safety barriers as, “Physical 
and/or non-physical means planned to prevent, control, or mitigate undesired events or 
accidents”.xxvi  Protecting an information system from a catastrophic Critical Event entail setting 
information security controls in place to govern such events.  These controls consist of policies, 
procedures, best practices, software or hardware to monitor and identify “causes” from 
occurring, or how to leverage “consequences” after the Critical Event occur.   
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One of three reasons that de Dianous and Fiévez imply to implement barriers, is to help identify 
areas that are not sufficiently controlled yet.xxvii  Current barriers which already exist, help 
identify “cost/benefit” for the organization and reduces the overall cost of Annual Loss 
Expectancy.  Barriers not in place become possible investments for executives and stakeholders 
to invest.  With dynamic change in technology, barriers can constantly be updated as the 
organization grows and develop new technology.  Re-assessing the needs of the organization is a 
priority.   
Within the Bowtie Model, barriers are placed between each “Cause” or “Consequence” leading 
to and from the Critical Event.  From the Fault Tree barriers represent security controls set in 
place to mitigate a threat from occurring.  Barriers placed on the Event Tree side represent 
security controls or policies to mitigate certain consequences following a critical event.  Barriers 
are flexible and may be used to mitigate more than one “cause” or “consequence”.   
Applying Bowtie Model to Cyber Risk Management Framework 
Quantitative Cyber Risk Analysis relies on four steps of the Bowtie Model to calculate cost for 
an organizations budget.  Barriers identified throughout the model are heavily relied on to assess 
the organizations current security controls in place to withstand a critical event.  Cost is then 
determined based on cost of barriers unmet, asset value, and estimated costs of data records 
compromised.   
In order to develop estimated costs Operational Security processes will be used to build our 
bowtie model.  Operational Security is a military analytical process that classifies information 
assets and determines the controls required to protect them.  Five steps are correlated to prevent 
potential adversaries from discovering critical operations-related to data; (1) Identify critical 
information, (2) Determine threats, (3) Analyze vulnerabilities, (4) Assess risk,  and (5) Apply 
appropriate countermeasures.xxviii  These five steps will be implemented to identify the four 
methods of the bowtie, and determine the controls required to protect or mitigate a critical event 
from occurring: 
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I. Step 1.  Identify critical information:  Determine what assets and data are most 
important to the organization.    
II. Step 2.  Determine Threats:  Determine what threats are critical to an organization’s 
assets and data.  Verizon Data Breach Reports classify four types of threats.  Two of 
the four threats to help build the bowtie model are “Threat Agents” and “Threat 
Actions”.  Threat agents refer to entities that cause or contribute to an incident.  They 
are best classified by three categories including, internal, external, or as a partner.   
Threat actors determine what method the attacker used to accomplish the breach.  It 
describes what the threat agent did to cause or contribute to the breach.  These are 
normally broken into seven categories: 
 
1. Malware 
2. Hacking 
3. Social  
4. Misuse 
5. Physical 
6. Error 
7. Environment 
III. Step 3.  Analyze Vulnerabilities: What weaknesses are in jeopardy of allowing 
threats to penetrate critical assets and compromise data identified in Step 1?  Third - 
party assessments are commonly used to determine vulnerabilities. 
IV. Step 4.  Assess Risk:  Assess the vulnerabilities identified in Step 3.  Determine the 
level of threat associated with each of them and how damaging an attack would be to 
the organization continuity and loss of finances.   
V. Step 5.  Apply appropriate countermeasures:  Implement a plan to mitigate the 
risks.  This involves identifying controls to protect and mitigate risk identified.  List 
both current and necessary barriers to fulfill requirements.  Technical staff or third 
party is recommended for consultation. 
 
24 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Bowtie Diagram 
 
Once steps are completed, the bowtie model should present a diagram structured similar to 
Figure 3, including scope of critical events, threats or vulnerabilities, consequences, and security 
controls.  This scope is quantified using cost/benefit calculated estimates.  The cost of existing 
security controls is taken into consideration.  Once the necessary controls are incorporated into 
the model and cost is identified the quantitative analysis along with cost/benefit calculations is 
ready to be completed and presented to executives and stakeholders for decisioning.    
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYZING DATA RESULTS 
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To build a quantitative framework for cyber risk management, an analysis of patterns and data 
records cost must be identified.  Patterns will identify which assets are targeted (Assets) and 
what action affected the asset (Actions).  Early Verizon Data Breach Reports refer to the four 
A’s to represent the minimum information necessary to describe an incident or threat 
scenario.xxix   
Table 1 The Four A's 
Actors Whose actions affected the asset 
Actions What actions affected the asset 
Assets Which assets were affected 
Attributes How the assets were affected 
 
With the four A’s an incident can be structured to measure frequency, identify controls which 
protect or mitigate a breach, and associate impact to an incident or breach.   
As previously mentioned, in the absence of multiple decades of prehistoric data, cyber risk 
management is difficult for most organizations to construct.  Patterns and trends derive from 
analyzing historical data, which make identifying frequency rates and forecasting attacks 
possible.  Verizon and Ponemon Institute have constructed reports and gathered data consistently 
for the past decade.  The following reports will be analyzed accordingly: 
 Verizon Data Breach Reports:  
• Identify patterns of incidents associated to specific industries 
• Identify targeted assets   
• Identify types of attacks 
• Identify targeted data   
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Ponemon Institute Reports: 
• Identify cost of breach to an organization 
• Identify cost of breach to assets 
• Identify cost of breach to data records 
• Identify cost of breach associated with specific industries 
Common Industry Data Breaches 
Verizon Data Breach reports have categorized incidents and breaches into seven categories based 
on common threat actions.  These seven actions can be categorized into nine patterns of attacks.  
These seven actions will be discussed in detailed, but first it is important to analyze how Verizon 
attained and categorized these nine patterns. 
Verizon conducts machine learning on incidents over time, which allows them to discover and 
categorize the nine patterns mentioned above.  Machine learning is an intricate scientific 
program learning language which arithmetically organizes data based on features and labels.  
These features are organized by running arithmetic codes to classify or cluster data, until a 
pattern becomes constant and does not change.  It is a very high processing procedure which is 
capable of analyzing a plethora of information captured from a data source in a matter of hours.  
These technical skills are not performed in an average day’s work, but is a dedicated time-
consuming skill, usually performed by a third party or a large corporation such as Verizon.   
Verizon uses the four A’s to find recurring combinations of actors, actions, assets, and attributes.  
To expose dormant patterns, the Verizon for Event Recordings and Incident Sharing (VERIS) 
team applies a statistical clustering technique by creating a matrix accumulating incidents within 
each of the common VERIS enumerations and calculations.  The distance is then calculated 
between each enumeration and incident. This allows grouping of clusters or patterns strongly 
related to VERIS enumerations within the incident dataset.  The relationship between an incident 
and an enumeration must be distinct from other combinations.  VERIS looks for clusters to 
describe comprehensive incident classifications versus frequent pairing.  Once a pattern has been 
identified, such as an ATM attacked by an organized criminal group to steal credit card 
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payments, the pattern is labeled “skimmers”.  The incident is removed and cluster re-ran to 
analyze the remaining incidents and enumerations. xxx 
In conclusion VERIS discovered nine patterns which confirmed 94% of data breaches collected 
in 2013.  These nine patterns are used in the Verizon Data Breach Reports to describe the 
frequency rates at which they occur from reported incidents: 
1. Point of Sale (POS) Intrusion 
2. Web Application Attacks 
3. Insider Misuse 
4. Physical Theft/Loss 
5. Miscellaneous Errors 
6. Crimeware 
7. Card Skimmers 
8. DoS Attacks 
9. Cyber-espionage 
In 2010 VERIS identified seven primary threat actions: 
1. Malware 
2. Hacking 
3. Social 
4. Misuse 
5. Physical 
6. Error 
7. Environmental 
Using these established patterns, stakeholders and executives should be knowledgeable of cyber 
threats and the targeted asset(s).  Each organization is able to concentrate primarily on which 
pattern of incidents are significant in their industry.  Executives will be able to calculate the 
Return on Investment and make clearer decision of whether budget is cost effective to invest. 
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Two choices are applicable to managing risk after identifying a pattern of attacks and the threat 
actions associated to an event; one makes a decision to invest, or two not invest in applying 
controls to mitigate risk.  For instance, a smaller organization whose data does not consume 
Personal Identification or proprietary information decide not to invest in the most expensive 
network equipment or technical services to protect their data.  However, they may budget to 
replace equipment in case an attack occurs.  On the other hand, larger organizations (i.e. 
healthcare organizations) data may contain millions of health records along with research and 
costly data.  Management may make the decision not to invest in technical services, but instead 
purchase expensive equipment in addition to an offsite data center to store data and disaster 
restore systems.  These can be used to connect and restore access while replacing infected 
equipment on location.   
Unskilled technical managers may not have the expertise to implement necessary controls or 
network design.  However, from the examples above, allowing an opportunity to have insight on 
which threats are most significant to their organization, allows the best decision for the resilience 
and continuity for the organization.  
Table 1 provides a description for each of nine patterns listed above.  These terms label the 
attack patterns used to breach data, followed with a brief description, and the industry targeted 
by this attack.       
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Table 2 Descriptions of 9 Patterns (Categories) 
 
Pattern Description Industry 
Crimeware Malware that did not fit into a more specific pattern.  
Majority of incidents are opportunities in nature and have 
financial motivation.  Affects consumers and where 
“typical” malware infections will land 
▪ Public 
▪ Information 
▪ Finance 
Cyber Espionage Incidents include unauthorized network or system access 
linked to state-affiliated Actors (who) and/or exhibiting the 
motive of espionage (spying) 
▪ Public 
▪ Information 
▪ Manufacturing 
Denial of Service Any attack intended to compromise the availability of 
networks and systems. Includes both network and 
application attacks designed to overload systems, resulting 
in performance degradation or interruptions of service 
▪ Gaming 
▪ Information 
Technology 
▪ IT Services 
▪ Financial 
Insider and 
Privilege Misuse 
Any unapproved or malicious use of organizational 
resources.  This is mainly insider-only misuse (due to 
collusion) and partners (because they are granted 
privileges) show up as well.   
▪ Public 
▪ Healthcare 
▪ Finance 
Miscellaneous 
Errors 
Incidents where unintentional actions directly compromised 
a security attribute of an information asset. (does not 
include loss of devices) 
▪ Public Health 
▪ Information 
▪ Healthcare 
Payment Card 
Skimmers 
All incidents in which a skimming device was physically 
implanted (tampering) on an asset that reads magnetic 
stripe data from a payment card (e.g. ATMs, gas pumps, 
POS terminals, etc.) 
▪ Finance 
▪ Retail 
Physical Theft 
and Loss 
Any incident where an information asset went missing, 
whether through misplacement or malice 
▪ Public 
▪ Healthcare 
Point of Sale 
Intrusions 
Remote attacks against the environments where card-
present retail transactions are conducted.  POS terminals 
and POS controllers are the targeted assets.   
▪ Accommodations 
and Food Services 
▪ Retail 
Web-Attacks App Any incident in where a web application was the vector of 
attack.  Includes exploits of code-level vulnerabilities in the 
application as well as thwarting authentication mechanisms.  
▪ Finance 
▪ Information 
▪ Retail 
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Seven Primary Threat Actions 
 In concordance with the nine pattern of data breaches the seven most common attack threat 
actions are important to understand.  The four A’s, also referred to as Threat Agents, are how the 
nine patterns derived and formed a pattern during VERIS clustering techniques.  Threat agents 
are summarized to provide information about who (Actors), what (Assets), how (Actions), and 
why (Attributes) incidents occur. 
Verizon for Event Recordings and Incident Sharing, focuses on industries and the attack method 
an industry may be susceptible too.  Data was captured in a Table 3 from Verizon reports, 
relating the nine attack patterns with an industry.  Each industry is followed with a North 
American Industry Classification Standard (NAICS) xxxi code to identify which organizations 
correlate to this industry.  
Table 3 also relates the threat actions most common to an industry per year.  These threat actions 
will be used in quantitative assessment and applied by estimating cost of controls, assets, and 
records at risk.  Organizations are associated with the industry and NAICS code to quickly see 
what attack method threatens their organization.  The first two digits of NAICS code will 
populate a list of common industries classified to specific codes.   
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Table 3 Most Common Pattern per Industry 
  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Crimeware 
N/A Construction 
(23) 
Public (92) Public (92) Healthcare 
(62) 
Healthcare 
(62) 
Professional 
(54) 
Cyber 
Espionage 
N/A Mining (21) Manuf. 
(31-33) 
Manf.  
(31-33) 
Manf.  
(31-33) 
Public (92) Public (92) 
Denial of 
Service 
N/A Management 
(55) 
 Finance (52) Information 
(51) 
 Professional 
(54) 
Insider 
Privilege and 
Misuse 
N/A Real Estate 
(53) 
Mining Healthcare 
(62) 
Healthcare 
(62) 
Accom. (72) Healthcare 
(62) 
Miscellaneous 
Errors 
N/A Administrative 
(56) 
Healthcare 
(62) 
Public (92) Healthcare 
(62) 
Healthcare 
(62) 
Healthcare 
(62) 
Payment Card 
Skimmers 
 Finance (52) Finance 
(52) 
Finance (52) Finance 
(52) 
Retail (44-45) Finance (52) 
Physical Theft 
Loss 
Finance 
(52) 
Healthcare 
(62) 
Other 
Services () 
Healthcare 
(62) 
Healthcare 
(62) 
Healthcare 
(62) 
Healthcare 
(62) 
Point of Sale 
Finance 
(52) 
Accom. (72) Accom. (72) Accom. (72) Accom. (72) Accom. (72) Accom. (72) 
Web Attacks 
Finance 
(52) 
Information 
(51) 
Information 
(51) 
Finance (52) Finance 
(52) 
Information 
(51) 
Retail  
(44-45) 
Note: 
- Accommodation = Accom. 
- Manufacturing = Manf. 
 
 
Identifying Assets 
After understanding the patterns and threats which target the organization, identifying assets is 
the first step in cyber risk management framework.  This also correlates with NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework standards.xxxii  Understanding what is at stake in your organization is 
the most supportive piece of information for executives and management to determine.  This 
leads to the ability to financially assess the initial cost of assets.   
Understanding the cost of assets determines the level of value for an asset.  Today, most 
information is digitized in some form.  Digital information become the valued asset, whether it 
reside within an on-premises computer, electrical device, or a third-party’s cloud network.  
Therefore, cost of asset is determined by the valued information stored on the asset, normally 
consisting of data records containing the organization’s most important information.  This 
information may range from proprietary research, client files, credit card transactions, 
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demographics of services, patient files, etc.  Without this information, the organization daily 
operations would come to a halt or cause significant revenue loss when not available.    
Cybersecurity’s initial concern is the protection of data.  The value of this information is 
compounded by its dependence on other assets to function properly.  For instance, staff members 
who assess client’s behavior normally enter data from a laptop or computer connected to the 
internal network.  Each local connection within a network is a pathway into the network.  That 
computer or device becomes a targeted source by attacker.  The actor who seeks to compromise 
these devices desire to cause disruption of the network, theft, or destruction to an organization’s 
asset. 
The ability to identify assets susceptible to attacks helps eliminate planning and budgeting for 
objects of less concern.  For instance, a staff member’s laptop may be stolen.  If this laptop is 
protected with a company password, encrypted files, and requires password to access the 
network and database records, proper controls have been selected and the cost of asset is 
narrowed down to replacing the device itself.  However, if the laptop contains no security 
controls and is lost or stolen, not only is the cost of laptop calculated, but the value of each 
record which may be compromised from the laptop becomes an additional cost along with direct 
and indirect cost repercussions (i.e. lawsuits by private parties for improper security controls in 
place).   
Executives and management are only concerned with assets that are significant to the operations 
of the organization.  Without proper insight on what is at risk, managing risk will be ineffective 
and more costly.  These decisions are made after compiling all assets and analyzing threats 
applicable to the environment.  Cost of assets are a determining factor for stakeholders and 
executives deciding whether to accept loss or invest in protecting its value.  The final investment 
decision is based on the assets rate of return compared to financial loss the organization 
experience from a critical event.   
After gathering data from Verizon reports, the seven threat categories can help predict what is at 
risk.  These seven threat categories will be refenced throughout reports going forward.  The 
original seven threats are compiled in Table 4 from 2009 Verizon Database Report: 
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Table 4 Description of Seven Threats 
Hacking 
 
Malicious actions against an informational system 
 
Malware 
 
Captures, stores, and sends data to a remote entity, or enables remote access 
to a control of the infected system 
 
Misuse 
 
Use of organizational resources and/or privileges for any other purpose than 
for that which it was originally intended 
 
Deceit/Social 
 
Use of deception or misrepresentation to exploit people, security measures, 
procedures, or anything that furthers the goal of data compromise 
 
Physical  
 
Lost or theft of an asset, system access, tampering, wiretapping, over the 
shoulder observation, assault or threat 
 
Error 
 
Only errors directly caused or significantly contributed to a compromise; 
poor decisions, omissions, noncompliance, and process 
 
Environmental 
 
Catastrophic behaviors such as storms, fires, tornadoes, hurricanes, etc. etc. 
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As previously stated, information becomes the valued object targeted by attackers.  Each of the 
seven threats may affect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a data record.  Once the 
target asset has been identified, the number of records in jeopardy of being affected quantify the 
total loss involved after a data breach occurs.  Calculating the cost per record reveals a portion of 
budget necessary to recover from loss of data or downtime.  Other cost will be considered later.   
Understanding assets at risk and threats which target specific data, executives and management 
will present clear recommended security controls to mitigate risk.  As an example, consider a 
mental organization inability to access data records to a patient database.  Without access to a 
database, the company may lose “x” amount of dollars per day.  Each day the records which are 
not accessible to the organization is unable to properly administer patient care (i.e. medicine 
dosage amount, allergic reactions, emotional disturbance, etc.).  Mitigating the cost of this 
critical event becomes relevant to the organization at this point.  Decisions such as purchasing an 
off-site service and renewing annual fees versus losing data and not having access for an 
extensive amount of time becomes important.  Stakeholders and executives must make this 
decision for the benefit of the entire organization. 
Table 5 identify the annual percentage of the seven most frequent threat actions occur.  In earlier 
reports the actions were related to records lost in data compromises.  Reports after 2014 begin to 
relate these seven threat actions to compromised data pertaining to different industries.  Tailoring 
reports to reflect threats according to specific industry allow executives to predict the percentage 
of records exposed during a critical event. 
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Table 5 Breaches Per Year 
Years 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Total Breaches 90 141 761 855 621 1367 2122 2260 3156 2608 2396 
Total Record loss 
(Approx.) 
285 
Million 
143 
Million 
3.8 
Million 
174 
Million 
44 
Million  
     
Hacking Caseload 64% 40% 50% 81% 52% 
  
66% 31% 36% 33% 
Hacking Record Loss 94% 96% 89% 99% 
       
Malware Caseload 38% 38% 49% 69% 40% 
  
53% 27% 21% 17% 
Malware Record Loss 90% 94% 79% 95% 
       
Misuse Caseload 22% 48% 17% 5% 13% 
  
8% 7% 8% 9% 
Misuse Record Loss 2% 3% 1% 1% 
       
Deceit/Social 
Caseload 12% 28% 11% 7% 29% 
  
30% 22% 11% 21% 
Deceit/Social Record 
Loss 6% 3% 1% 37% 
       
Physical Caseload 9% 15% 29% 10% 35% 
  
4% 4% 8% 2% 
Physical Loss 2% 1% 10% 1% 
       
Error Caseload 68% 2% 1% 1% 2% 
  
8% 7% 13% 15% 
Error Record Loss 0% 0% 1% 1% 
       
Environmental 
Caseload 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
  
0% 0% 0% 0% 
Environmental 
Record Loss 0% 0% 0% 0% 
       
 
 
 
37 
 
Cost of Data Breaches 
Ponemon Institute provide case studies covering costs an organization incur when responding to 
data breaches.  Primarily, IBM and Symantec Cost of Data Breach Studies are analyzed for this 
paper.  Different versions of Ponemon are published including but not limited to: Cost of a Data 
Breach U.S. Report, Cost of Data Breach Global Report, and Consumer Study of Data Breach 
Notification.  The resources most referred to in this paper are to identify cost effect of data 
breaches.  Data is analyzed and compiled from Cost of a Data Breach U.S. Report and Cost of 
Data Breach Global Report.  
Ponemon reports take into account the following cost-effective attributes: business costs 
(including expense outlays for detection), escalation of services, notifications, after-the-fact (ex-
post) responses, loss of customer trust or confidence, customer turnover rate, and service rates. 
The Ponemon Institute and Pretty Good Privacy Corporation quantifies the actual costs of data 
breaches for organizations.  Estimations are from benchmark surveys released to companies who 
voluntarily agree to participate.  Costs are based on activities resulting from actual data loss 
incidents.  The survey pertains responses to questions an organization would answer when 
responding to a data breach such as: 
• What are the potential legal costs? 
• What is industry-average costs resulting from a breach, including the detection, 
investigation, notification, and possible services offered to affected individuals? 
• What are the costs of lost customers and brand damage? 
• What are the key trends? 
• What measures are taken following a breach that could have been implemented to avert 
it?xxxiii 
Ponemon used the shadow costing method to design the survey participants completed.  Actual 
accounting results are not expected, but instead organizations provide broad estimates based on 
the experience of the subject.   
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For each category, cost estimation was a two-stage process, direct cost and indirect cost 
estimates.  Respectfully a range variable was used to determine direct cost estimations.  The 
second estimation consist of an opportunity cost estimate provided separately.  Calculations are 
based on relative magnitude of costs in comparison to direct cost within a given category.   
How Cost is Calculated 
Ponemon uses a core process-related activity which drive the range of expenditures associated 
with an organization’s data breach.  The four applied costs include detection, response, 
containment and remediation.xxxiv 
1. Detection or discovery (detection):  Activities that enable a company to reasonably 
detect the breach of personal data either at risk (data in stored in a location) or in motion 
(transfer of data). 
2. Escalation (response):  Activities necessary to report the breach of protected information 
to appropriate personnel within a specified time period. 
3. Notification (containment):  Activities that enable the company to notify data subjects 
with a letter, outbound telephone call, email or general notice that personal information 
was lost or stolen. 
4. Ex-post response (remediation):  Activities to help victims of a breach communicate 
with the company, to ask additional questions or obtain recommendations in order to 
minimize potential harms.  Redress activities also include ex-post responses such as 
credit report monitoring or reissuing of a new account (or credit card). 
The Opportunity Cost Method used by Ponemon is to evaluate the “lifetime value” of the 
customer to an organization.  Data breach costs impact organizations years after a breach occur.  
Ponemon Data Breach Report 2019 was able to release after effect results for eighty-six 
companies after a data breach occurred.  In their results average costs of breach were 67% within 
the first year.  Second- and third-year breach costs were 22% and 11% respectively.   
Data breach costs also relate to customer turnover rates.  Current and future customer deficit 
rates relate to higher cost in an organization’s loss of business and placing greater strains if not 
closure to the organization.   
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Ponemon relate two categories resulting from these costs: 
1. Turnover of existing customers:  The estimated number of customers who will most 
likely terminate their relationship as a result of the breach incident.  Estimates are 
annual percentages provided by management during Ponemon’s benchmark interview. 
2. Diminished customer acquisition:  The estimated customers who will not have a 
relationship with the organization as a consequence of the breach. 
Based on these categories Ponemon 2019 reports released costs associated to smaller 
organizations (500 - 1,000 employees) approximately $2.93 million and $204 per record.   
Building Quantitative Assessment information from Data Reports 
Organizing threats to identify an interference to the organization mission/business are the key 
point of interest for executives and stakeholders.  Utilizing Verizon Data Breach Reports to 
recognize the trending patterns according to industries concerning their organization will allow 
technical and management staff to eliminate over bombarding executives and stakeholders with 
unnecessary information.  Four important costs are necessary to help build a quantitative 
assessment.  Using the Annual Rate of Occurrence calculation as a guideline 
Table 3 layout the seven major threat actions to compromise data for past ten years.  Hacking, 
Malware, and Deceit/Social threat actions are responsible for 90% of compromised data 
breaches.  Data forensic investigations have consistently identified these threats as root causes to 
breached data.  Four algorithms are calculated to obtain the final Annual Rate of Occurrence 
(ARO).  This rate estimates the potential loss and calculates the rate per year in order to 
determine the magnitude of the risk, also known as Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE): 
1. Find the value and cost of most important assets.  Use Verizon Data Breach reports to 
discover the asset most susceptible to be attacked in your industry.  Calculate the Single 
Loss Expectancy (SLE).   
2. Find the average cost of data record to your organization (see Ponemon Reports).  
Ponemon Data Cost reports can be used to calculate the cost of this SLE.   
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3. Direct and Indirect Cost will be calculated as an exposure factor.  Ponemon Data Cost 
reports will be used to assist with estimating these costs. 
4. Customer Turnover Rate is the second exposure factor to calculate.  Ponemon Data Cost 
reports will be used to calculate this estimate also. 
 
In order for smaller organizations to be knowledgeable of threat actions, larger organizations 
release specific information detailing attacks and investigations.  As previously mentioned in 
Chapter 2, many smaller organizations do not have finances or skill level to construct intricate 
levels of investigations therefore larger organization sharing information is able to fulfill gaps of 
missing information. 
Method Processes 
Method 1:  To understand the pattern of assets an organization is known for being breached, 
helps organizations quickly identify what and where to look first.  For instance, a Purchase of 
Sale (POS) or Credit Card Skimmer system is known for being attacked in the retail industry.  
Immediately a small business owner identifies the most targeted entrance an attacker is prone to 
target.  Answering questions regarding the location of devices helps lead to identifying cost of 
equipment.  Is this a mobile retail shop, stationary shop, public or private organization?  Is just a 
terminal involved, or is a server on location?  Identifying assets will be vital to the next method 
of identifying where data is stored.   
In Table 6 the most common assets attacked for the past three years in each industry are grouped 
together.  According to investigation of breaches conducted by Verizon and their partners three 
targeted assets are most common to be breached in each industry, servers, user devices, and a 
person (i.e. Phishing).  Servers are the most targeted device common to threat actions.  This 
poses a concern for majority of organizations who either store data on location servers or in 
cloud servers.  Our next step will concentrate more on what’s stored on servers and the cost of 
losing it.  For now, we are only concerned with the cost of replacing these assets, downtime, man 
hours, or having to seek third party assistance to help clean and restore assets.  These costs will 
calculate SLE.  Calculation details are discussed Chapter VI. 
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Table 6 Industries Top Three Common Asset Breached Per Year 
 
Years 
 
Accom. 
(72) 
 
Education 
(61) 
Finance (52) 
 
Healthcare 
(62) 
 
Information 
(51) 
 
Manf.  
(31-32) 
 
Public 
(92) 
Retail (44-45) 
2017 
1st  Server Server Server Server Server Server 
User 
Device Server 
2017 
2nd 
User Device Person Person Media Person  User Device Person Kiosk/Terminal 
2017 
3rd 
Person 
User 
Device User Device Person User Device Server Server User Device 
2018 
1st  Server Server Server Server Server Server Server Server 
2018 
2nd 
User Device Person Kiosk/Terminal Media Person  Person 
User 
Device Kiosk/Terminal 
2018 
3rd 
Person 
User 
Device Person 
Person & 
User Device User Device User Device Person 
User Device & 
Media 
2019 
1st  Server Server Server Server Server Server Person Server 
2019 
2nd 
User Device Person Person Person Person  Person 
User 
Device Person 
2019 
3rd 
Person 
User 
Device User Device Media User Device User Device Server User Device 
Note: 
- Accommodation = Accom. 
- Manufacturing = Manf. 
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Smaller organization will need to tailor information according to their business needs.  To 
improperly evaluate the cost of assets may lead to under or over estimating, resulting in poor 
security controls planning.  Executives and stakeholders should be presented with a realistic 
picture in order to determine operational budget decisions.   
Method 2: Once the cost of organizations’ assets is determined, the focus transitions to the data 
stored within the devices.  Compromised data records are the costliest expenditure of any breach.  
The Exposure Rate (discussed in Chapter VI) will help determine more of SLE cost.  Figure 4 
displays the average cost per record from a global perspective.  Tallying the cost of an 
organizations record loss quantifies how much a company is at risk if compromised data occur.  
For the past ten years the average global cost per record is approximately $156.60 per record.  
This the second SLE calculations organizations combine with Method 1.  Consequences of data 
records exceed beyond just replacement of records.  The organization becomes liable not only 
for the record, but for negative outcomes each individual record may cause personally, as a result 
from the breach.  For example, stolen credit card records can cause users to replace a card.  The 
average cost to replace a bank card is $5, however the organization must consider replacing 
every record holder’s card.  Therefore, $5 x 1,000 records yield $5,000.  Cost can rise steep and 
quick once breach is made public.     
 
 
 $-
 $50.00
 $100.00
 $150.00
 $200.00
 $250.00
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
Average Cost Per Capita Record
Figure 4 Average Cost Per Capita Record 
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Method 3: Direct and Indirect costs are additional expenses relating to loss or compromised data 
(details in Chapter VI).  In addition to method 2 another Exposure Rate cost is added into the 
calculations.   
Indirect costs include what organizations spend on additional resources to rectify a data breach.  
This could include man-hours consumed by distributing notification of the breach incident, 
investigation of the incident, notifying clients or customers, printing information and notices, etc.  
Also, included in these costs are loss of brand affect current and future cost, as well as reputation 
and customer turnover.   
Direct costs include the cost an organization acquire to minimize the data breach and assist their 
victims.  These costs may include forensic experts assisting in investigating a breach more in 
depth, hiring law firms to fight on behalf of the organization, protecting the identification of the 
clients or repairing damage incurred from the breach (i.e. credit repair).  Figure 5 identify the 
direct and indirect global cost per capita for the past eleven years. 
 
Figure 5 Direct and Indirect Cost Per Capita 
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 $200.00
 $250.00
2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018 2020
Direct and Indirect Cost Per Capita
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Method 4:  Customer turnover rate is calculated as a third factor of Exposure Rate.  All 
industries are customer driven and comprised of serving clientele in some manner.  When there 
is no demand for a service or product, an organization economic growth cannot sustain and 
resulting in greater loss of business, eventually closure.   
Knowledge regarding customer trends over time help the organization understand a more in-
depth picture of data breaches effect.  Analyzing change over time highlights area of customer 
concern for industries.  Figures 6-9 analyze customer turnover rate delivered from reports 
Ponemon Institute surveyed for the past three years.        
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Figure 6 2016 Industry Customer Turnover Rate 
 
 
Figure 7 2018 Industry Customer Turnover Rate 
  
 
Figure 8 2017 Industry Customer Turnover Rate 
 
Figure 9 Average Customer Turnover Rate 2010-2018 
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Small and Medium organizations can estimate risk based on reports from Verizon and Ponemon.  
By recognizing patterns, threats, assets, and cost factors, management and executives are able to 
present solid foundational estimates for stakeholders to review and consider investing into 
operational budget to mitigate risk.  Stakeholders need to see how investing will capitalize in the 
overall business plan.  For risk budget to be effective, there must be a clear picture of the return 
on investment for the organization.  The risk management plan must exemplify this return on 
investment will protect or mitigate the organization from failing to achieve its business plan from 
a catastrophic event.  The framework in Chapter 6 will put the whole model together. 
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CHAPTER VI  
CYBER RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK: AN INTEGRATION OF 
THE VERIZON AND PONEMON REPORTS 
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Figure 10 Cyber Risk Framework Model 
The purpose of my Cyber Risk Management Framework is a strategy for small and medium 
(1,000 employees or less) organizations to identify, estimate, and prioritize risk to their 
organizational operation budget.  What separates this framework is the integration of Verizon 
and Ponemon Data Reports to efficiently estimate cost of data breaches.  The Bowtie Model has 
been introduced to precisely introduce security controls and calculate Cost Benefit Analysis 
(CBA).  In efforts of making a Cyber Risk Management Framework more appealing to 
executives and stakeholders, this framework adopts language and methods from the FAIR Risk 
49 
 
Management cost effective approach.  The four concepts below provide “common terminology” 
to assist in compressing the language gap between technical and executive staff members:   
• Cost-effective risk management:  a program that meets the definition of risk 
management; the combination of personnel, policies, processes and technologies that 
enable an organization to cost-effectively achieve and maintain an acceptable level of 
loss exposure. 
• Well-informed decisions: every decision involves a choice 
• Meaningful measurements: quantitative financial measurements 
• Accurate Models: models of risk and of explicit risk management that can scale in 
real-lifexxxv 
The main goal of my framework is to provide a more cost-effective quantitative analysis 
approach to Cyber Risk Management.  This purpose aligns with NIST guide to conducting a Risk 
Assessment which is to identify, estimate, and prioritize risk to organizational operation, 
organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, resulting from operation 
and use of information systems.xxxvi  
Risk Framework is also an opportunity of sharing information not only with executives but with 
insurance carriers and other organizations.  Risk Assessment Framework is a strategy for 
prioritizing and sharing information about the security risks to an information technology 
infrastructure.xxxvii  As discussed in Chapter 2, insurance providers lack information and history 
of data breach cost.  Therefore, premiums are higher and do not efficiently cover damages.  
Organizations with a framework in place identify areas of weakness, strength, and cost.  
Insurance carriers are more adapted to invest when operational risk management planning is 
justified.   
The Cyber Risk Management Framework Model (CRMF) in Figure 10 is to be followed from an 
inner to outer approach.  The inner core contains the reports used to gather necessary information 
to efficiently evaluate an organization completing step 2; identifying assets and estimating cost 
of loss to the organization due to a data breach.  Organizing pre historical data will lead to an 
efficient risk quantification of assets and data records.  The outer realm lead to determining 
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meaningful measurements of cost estimated benefits and calculating the total cost to manage 
cyber risk.  Once completed executives will have a quantified cost-effective, well-informed 
decision risk analysis to present to stakeholders to invest budget for risk management in 
operational plan.  
Stakeholders desire to see a more transparent, detailed, business applied approach to cyber risk 
management.  Using Key Performance Indicatorsxxxviii to design my framework, there were ten 
recommendations which assisted in applying to stakeholder’s appeal: 
• Be based on quantities that can be influenced, or controlled by the user alone or in 
cooperation with others 
• Be objective and not based on opinion 
• Be derived from strategy and focus on improvement 
• Be clearly defined and simple to understand 
• Be relevant with an explicit purpose 
• Be consistent (in that significance is maintained as time goes by) 
• Be specific and relate to specific goals/targets 
• Be precise – be exact about what is being measured 
• Provide timely and accurate feedback 
• Reflect the “business process” 
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Applying Quantitative Algorithm  
The CRMF is designed from a three-step process: (1) Find common patterns, (2a) Determine 
Asset and its cost, (2b) Estimate data cost per asset, (2c) Calculate Data Cost, (3a) design Bowtie 
Model and calculate Cost Benefit Analysis, (3b) Determine Controls (3c) Calculate Cost 
Benefits and Rate of Returnxxxix.  
These six steps reflect a combination of several resources including NIST Risk Management 
Framework, Cybersecurity Risk Framework, SANS Institute, and FAIR Basic Risk Assessment 
Methodology.  
Step 1a: Find the Common Patterns 
Tables 2 & 3 identify the nine most consistent common patterns used by attackers.  With this 
information, small to medium organizations can identify significant assets targeted within your 
industry.  Verizon Data Breach reports have investigated over 375,000 incidents, with over 
17,000 involving data breaches as of 2018.  Industries may retrieve these reports and discover 
which breaches affect their type of organization.  
Step 2a: Determine Assets Value and Cost  
Table 6 and Figure 4 connects targeted attacks in Step 1 to an asset and resource.  Targeted 
assets are identified in Table 6 and Average cost of data records are estimated in Figure 4.  Cost 
of records are subject to organization’s size, data volume, location of equipment, and accessible 
copies (resilience).    
Step two focuses on tangible and intangible resources.  Tangible resources are considered to be 
physical and intangible resources include software, logical infrastructure, firmware or services. 
Evaluating these assets depend on two key factors, volume and value/liability.xl     
The volume of assets allude to the fact of how many data records are in danger of being targeted 
by the same pattern of attacks.  Simply speaking this is just the count of devices or systems with 
critical data records at risk of being compromised. 
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Asset value/liability are defined by three characteristics: criticality, cost, and sensitivity.  
• Criticality of an asset considers the impact of an organization’s productivity.  If this 
asset were unable to perform how would revenue be affected? 
• Cost of an asset relate to the replacement of a device or system.  The amount of time 
it takes to not only replace, but restore the system to its full functionality. 
• Sensitivity of an asset covers the unexpected consequences of an asset being 
compromised.  To further collapse this point, four sub-categories can be considered: 
1. Reputation – the branding of the organization can be damaged or exposed to 
portray incompetence, criminal, or unethical management of protecting one’s 
environment from danger. 
2. Competitor’s Advantage – information exposed could enlighten competitors 
of sensitive, priority information. 
3. Legal – private, federal, and nonprofit lawsuits can be filed.  Also, the 
organization can lose more revenue than expected in protecting client 
information or relationship 
4. General – indirect cost 
Gathering and estimating the value of assets and data records will lead to more efficient 
calculations in Step 2.  The value of data records will need to be tailored to the organization’s 
environment.  Reports from Ponemon and Verizon are based on a volume of records ranging 
from 1,000 to 99,000 records.  Each organization will need to evaluate cost per record and base 
maximum cost value according to what Ponemon reports record. 
Step 2b: Estimating Data Cost Per Record 
Figure 4 yields an average amount of cost per record based on investigations over the past ten 
years.  Cost per record for an organization is not expected to exceed beyond the global reports 
produced by Ponemon.  One consideration may entail State or Federal laws enforcing additional 
penalties depending on location.  In the U.S. each state is governed by their own State Laws.  
Forty-eight states now enforce regulations to govern data breaches, but there is no Federal 
Regulation, except best practices at this time.  Therefore, each organization cost may differ 
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pertaining to their business needs.  Once the total value of loss per record is determined, an 
estimation is established and calculated.  For example, 2018 cost per record averaged $250.  If 
my organization is a health clinic and I hold approximately 15,000 records of patients who have 
visited my clinic throughout the years, each record is multiplied by $250.  Total loss is the 
product of 15,000 * $250 = $3,750,000.  This would be considered the baseline cost for the total 
number of records.  Security controls currently in place to mitigate attacks, are cogitated during 
cost/benefit calculations.  Cost of Benefits are calculated after step 2c. 
Step 2c: Calculate Data Cost 
The goal of calculations is to determine the Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE) of each asset, 
including its data. 
First, calculate the Single Loss Expectancy (SLE).  Two calculations will be used to find the 
single loss expectancy for each asset, in addition to the data stored on the asset calculated 
previously in Step one.  The Asset Value and Exposure Factor (EF) will determine the SLE 
dollar amount each threat potentially pose to an asset: 
 (Asset Value) * (Exposure Factor) = SLE  
The EF represents the percentage of loss a threat has to a specific asset.  To define percentages as 
a guiding point to the current example, take into consideration quarterly percentages, 25%, 50%, 
75%, and 100%.  
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Example:  A local dentist office wants to estimate the cost of a data breach occurring.    
-  value of a server is worth $10,000 (asset) 
-  Server contains approximately 5,000 records (asset) 
- 25% of record loss has been discovered (EF) 
-  Cost of losing one record is estimated at $250 (based on Ponemon 2018 reports) 
- Annual Rate of Occurrence once in ten years  
SLE * Cost of each record = Cost of Data Records 
  (amount of records * EF) * cost of each record = Cost of Data Records 
   = (5,000 * 25%) * $250 = $312,500 
 Asset Value + Cost of Data Records = Total SLE 
 $10,000 + $312,500 = $322,500 
Second, the Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO)2 must be considered to find the Annual Loss 
Expectancy (ALE):   
Annual Rate of Occurrence represents the estimated frequency of a specific threat taking 
place within a year.  Finding the product of this rate multiplied by the total SLE the Annual 
Loss Expectancy (ALE) is estimated.  For this example, data breach is considered to only 
occur once in a year.  There are instances when traces of attacks are left open through 
backdoor entrances and the attacker returns.  Rarely within the same year.  Therefore, ARO 
is 10% since this critical event is predicted to occur once in ten years.   
 
2Annual Rate of Occurrence will need to be considered for each organization, and may vary.  These rates will 
change the more data is collected in the future.  Verizon Data Breach Reports, disclose popular attack methods 
annually for each industry.  For instance, Table 3 identify nine attack patterns popular to industries each year.  
In Retail, only one Web Attack occurred in seven years.  Therefore, a critical event which entails web attacks 
for an organization or business in retail, may not be as critical since its occurrence rate is once in seven years 
(14%).   
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 SLE (total) * Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO) = ALE 
$322,500 * .1 = $32,250 → If a data breach occurs only once in ten years 
Calculating ALE will determine the financial cost of a breach.  However, it is not the final cost 
presented to executive and stakeholders.  Cost/benefit analysis must be taken into factor for 
meaningful measurements to be finalized.  This will be discussed in Step 3.  Also, the bowtie 
model in Step 3 will lead to identifying security controls in place.  Stakeholders will make the 
final decision to reduce the cost of risk, decide which controls are worth implementing to 
mitigate risk, transfer risk to an insurer, or except the cost.       
Step 3a: Design Bowtie Model 
Once the bowtie model is completed, management and executives will have clear details 
regarding what security controls currently exist and what is necessary to implement in planning.   
Designing the bowtie model reveal two important factors, causes and consequences affecting a 
critical event (top event) and barriers (security controls) to prevent or mitigate a critical event 
from occurring.  Once barriers are placed within the model, the last model is finalized.  The cost 
of a critical event can be assessed by estimating the cost of security controls in place and security 
controls necessary to implement.  This is a decision executives and stakeholders can choose 
rather to embrace this cost or accept the cost of impact from a critical event.  Figure 11 portrays a 
schematic of the bowtie model. 
 
Figure 11 Bowtie Diagram 
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Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) is determined by calculating the value of safeguards (security 
controls) to the company.  The ALE before existing controls are applied must be subtracted from 
the ALE after controls are applied.  This total amount will be reduced by the annual cost of each 
security control.  Cost Benefit Analysis measures the benefits of a decision which is taking 
action minus the costs associated with taking that action:xli  First calculate the value of 
safeguards to the company: 
 (ALE before implementing controls) – (ALE after existing controls are identified) - 
Annual cost of safeguard = value of safeguard to the company 
Organizations are next to be taken into consideration, the benefits of implementing controls 
(barriers) and subtract the cost associated with taking that action.  For the purpose of CRMF, the 
benefits of security controls are identified by protecting an organization from a critical event 
occurring.  This amount will be subtracted from the ALE before and after existing controls are 
identified. 
Security controls must be considered in its entirety when calculating the total cost.  There are 
tangible, intangible, infrastructure, and man hour costs to consider: 
• Product Costs (tangible) 
• Design/planning Costs (man hours) 
• Environmental Modification (individual organization infrastructure) 
• Compatibility with other controls (individual organization infrastructure) 
• Maintenance Requirements (tangible) 
• Testing Requirements (tangible) 
• Repair, replacement or update costs (tangible) 
• Operating and Support Costs (man hours) 
Once each control has been evaluated an accurate model can be completed.   
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Figure 12 Bowtie Example 
Step 3b: Determine Controls 
Example Cont.: For the scenario described in Figure 12 example, concentration will primarily be 
on implementing only one security control.  The local dentist office needs to know the 
cost/benefit of implementing a security control.  They discovered from the bowtie model their 
current infrastructure only has an antivirus active on each computer which accesses their on-
premises database.  They would like to implement a firewall with Intrusion Detection Software 
(IDS) to filter traffic and protect the inside network.   
- Existing Controls 
o Virus protection on 10 desktops = $600 
o Email protection through cloud services = $300 
o Server with access control = $500 
o Intrusion Prevention System = $1,000 
o Total Existing Controls Cost = $2,400 
- Company decides to purchase a CISCO Firewall to implement control 
o Price of IDS firewall = $5000 
o Man - hours to configure 8 hours @ $250/hr. 
o Man - hours to install and test in network 8 hours @ $250/hr. 
o Licenses =$500 
o Security Certificate = $55 yr. 
o Possible downtime loss $2500 
o Total Control Cost $12,055 
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Step 3c: Calculate Cost Benefit and Rate of Return 
(ALE before implementing controls) – (ALE after existing controls are identified) - Annual cost 
of safeguard = value of safeguard to the company (initial implementation) 
($322,500 - $2,400) - $12,055 = $308,045 
Value of safeguard / Single Loss Expectancy = Rate of Return on Investment 
308,045 / 322,500 = .955 or 96% 
Cost benefit of the dentist office implementing a firewall will benefit the company an estimated 
$308,045 to protect and mitigate the dentist office from a possible malware attack and 
compromising records on the server.  For the initial $12,055 invested to implement a firewall in 
lieu of a breach occurring, the organization yield a 96% return on investment if the firewall stops 
the breach from reaching its server and compromising records.  When configured properly the 
firewall will keep outside traffic from entering the network and attaining remote access. 
The ALE if a breach were to occur is estimated $322,500.  This example considered 5,000 
records compromised by a malware attack. Assuming only 25% of records were compromised 
cost has been reduced significantly.  Most breaches are not caught in time to limit the attackers 
damage.  Data breaches are discovered after months of existing in the network 60% of the 
time.xlii 
 
Figure 13 Discovery of Breach Timeline 
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This example has been simplified to identify only one critical event and a limited number of 
controls.  For an organization this process may be repeated a number of times to account for all 
assets and records.  For smaller organizations, at minimum the main asset which store data 
records is highly recommended to consider  
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CHAPTER VII  
CONCLUSION 
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Quantitative analysis provides a financial scope to best manage a data breach occurring.  With a 
base and implicit framework in place, managers and executives are able to have a jumpstart in 
organizing and presenting necessary details for stakeholders to invest and budget in operational 
plans. Cyber risk management cannot continue to be a reactive approach, as cyber breaches have 
proven to be the cause of organizations closing doors due to financial anguish.  There must be a 
solid approach to attacking this catastrophic behavior before the action transpire and cause 
irreversible damage. 
With the ability to track patterns, forecast estimations, and define a clear picture of current and 
necessary perimeters to mitigate catastrophic behaviors, organizations are better equipped to 
overcome the damage.  A Quantitative Framework will deliver a guide to this proactive approach 
especially in small to medium organizations.   
The CRMF entails necessary pre-historic resources to gather information regarding patterns of 
attacks and cost of breaches from dedicated reports by Verizon and Ponemon Institute.  The 
reports unveil cost estimations for assets and data records, to calculate the SLE, ARO, and ALE 
based on the estimates pertaining to the organization.  Next design a bowtie model to clearly 
define critical events susceptible to your industry/organization.  Threats, vulnerabilities, 
consequences, and security controls must be clearly defined.  Once Bowtie Model has been 
designed estimate the cost of two outcomes, current security controls in place and security 
controls necessary to implement.  For each outcome calculate estimations.  The final calculation 
combines all cost estimations and generate a cost/benefit estimation to observe return on 
investment.  
Once return on investment is captured, executive managers can now present before the board and 
discuss the financial estimates of mitigating cyber risk.  Stakeholders are presented with two 
important costs to determine the organization’s future.  The expected loss of business due to a 
cyber breach and the return on investment to prevent or mitigate a cyber data breach.  Managing 
risk concludes in three decisions stemming from the quantitative framework provided, accept 
risk, transfer risk, or invest in risk.  
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